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1 Introduction
This paper describes ways to estimate labour supply in Austria theoretically but
also empirically using EU-SILC data 2004-2006 from Statistik Austria.
In general there are two main approaches that will be discussed in detail in this work.
One is the unitary model whose main characteristic is that it perceives the household
as one decision-making unit. Practically this means that the household has only one
utility function that needs to be maximized. In order to use that specification the
income-pooling hypothesis has to be made. It states that the source of income does
not influence the consumption and labour supply choices of a household. Handling
a multi-person household as one decision-making unit is clearly handy however with
simplifications come shortcomings. Clear downsides are that no changes on an in-
dividual level can be observed.
The second model, the collective model, is superior from a microeconomic perspec-
tive in that sense that it perceives the household as a group of individuals each with
her/his own preferences. The main assumption is a pareto-efficient distribution of
allocations.1 This model does not treat the household as a black box and is thus
very appropriate to study changes in the labour supply of individuals. For exam-
ple in case one expects a policy to influence one partner more than the other, the
collective model will in most cases be the preferred choice. We will find out in the
applied part of the paper that this more realistic model will come at the price of
difficulties in the estimation procedure.
These two models will be used to explain discrete labour supply choices of multi-
person households. The discrete hours approach allows us to instead of considering a
continuous spectrum of choices, limit them to four working hours categories. These
will be not working, working 20, 40 and 60 hours per week. This is more realistic
than continuous choices since employers are not totally flexible but offer options
such as part- and full time contracts.
The preferences of children will not be considered. This is more relevant in the
collective setting since it accounts for individual preferences. It would however sim-
ply be beyond the scope of this paper to estimate power shares and to create utility
functions according to number and age of children in the household. Therefore, only
two household leaders (couple) will be considered in the collective utility function
and children will be used as explanatory variables. Moreover estimations by house-
hold type2 are carried out in both the collective and the unitary model. This is done
1An allocation is said to be pareto-efficient among all possible choices (over leisure and con-
sumption which satisfy the budget constraint) if one individual’s welfare can not be increased
without decreasing the welfare of the other.
2The household types indicates the number of children which are categorized as 0, 1, 2, or more
than 2.
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to understand if different household types call for specific utility functions.
Both models are based on the simple static labour supply model. Depending on the
household (in case of the unitary model) or on the individual preferences (in case of
the collective model) the indifference curves3 are defined. Their shape is determined
by the utility function used.
All income related variables such as wages, non-labour incomes, taxes and benefits
define the budget constraints. Combined the indifference curves and the budget
constraint define the utility maximizing problem.
For both specifications (so either for the household or for the individual) two dif-
ferent utility functions were used. These are the quadratic and the translog utility
function. The quadratic function, as the name suggests, uses squared variables while
the translog model is based on logarithmised variables. These are two of the most
commonly used models and were thus included to compare their applicability in this
context.
Their estimation on a household scale is exactly what the unitary model does.
The collective model requires some more estimation steps since the household has
to be split into individuals. To do so the first step is to divide the incomes between
the partners. The researcher can define this so called sharing rule. Typical variables
used to calculate the shares are wages and earning potential. Knowing these shares,
the budget constraint of each household member can be derived. The indifference
curves, originating from the utility specification, allow us to obtain the utility max-
imizing working hours. The maximizing utilities of both partners are weighted by
the bargaining power (share) wherefrom a household utility is derived.
To see which model is most suitable for Austria the European Union Statistics
on Income and Living Conditions (from now on referred as EU-SILC) from 2004-
2006 provided by Statistik Austria have been used. This data contains information
about economic and sociographic variables, which allow studies on various topics
such as housing, labour, health, pensions and education. The survey is conducted
on a yearly basis. Additionally every year one target research topic (module) is
issued. In 2010 this module will be Intra-household sharing of resources. This will
allow advanced studies of the collective model as more specific data addressing intra-
household distributions will be collected.
A first look at the data already allows us to obtain some interesting results. Low
educated women earn less and seem to have a much more elastic working behaviour
than men. The working hours choices of women seem to strongly depend on the
household type, while male ones seem to be independent of the number of children.
This observation leads us to fix men to their actual choice and only consider the
3Indifference curves describe all combinations of leisure and income that result in the same
utility.
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women’s choice in the collective model as one special case.
Apart from the data, information about the Austrian tax-transfer system were used
to construct a calculator that allows us to determine from a set of characteristics
how much taxes and benefits people pay respectively receive. This set includes infor-
mation on the marital status, the number and age of children, region, employment
situation and many other variables. This calculator is a central part of this work
since the amount subtracted and added to the gross income clearly affects the labour
supply choice.
The appropriate estimation method is the maximum likelihood one. Specifically
the conditional logit model, that next to individual specific variables (i.e. age, num-
ber of children) allows for alternative specific differences (i.e. income depending on
working hours), will be used. As will be explained, the estimation outcomes are a
probability distribution over utilities for each choice. If the working hours choices
that are actually chosen equal the choice that is utility maximizing with the highest
probability (as predicted) in many cases, the fit of the model is good. In case of the
unitary model, the two utility specifications (translog and quadratic) will be com-
pared according to fit statistics to see which of these fits better within the unitary
setting.
In the empirical part of this paper we will have to realize that for the unitary model
the income-pooling hypothesis cannot be supported by the Austrian EU-SILC data.
This result on its own questions the validity of all the estimation results of the uni-
tary model. If we neglect this finding for a second we find that the translog model
seems to have a higher fit than the quadratic one. It shows, as we would expect
that consumption and leisure have a positive influence on the utility of the house-
hold. More interestingly an increased appreciation of women for leisure is found
with many young kids in the household. Moreover leisure time seems to be valued
higher with age.
For the collective model one approach that constructs the household decision from
intermediate estimation results fails to lead to reasonable outcomes. Another ap-
proach, that is based on calibrations, first leads to unsatisfying results as it estimates
the power share to be either 0 or 1. We find that this is due to the formation of the
household utility function.
The grid search over a leisure interaction term of the partners does not show any
influence on the results at all. This further leads us to rethink the construction of
the combined utility.
Therefore another grid search has been executed to find the most appropriate way
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to sum up the individual utilities. With the maximizing functional form the highest
fit so far has been obtained.
Labour supply models are a main tool of economists since they allow them to pre-
dict alterations in working behaviour due to policy changes. Models as the ones
discussed in this paper help to foresee and prepare for shifts in the labour market.
The modelling technique of simulating policies and analyzing their effects is called
micro simulation.
This paper contributes to the understanding of the use of micro simulations, as it
compares two main approaches and discusses their applicability and suitability for
Austrian data.
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2 Theoretical Discussion of Labour Supply
Models
In this chapter both models are discussed in a purely theoretical way. This means
that their development, properties and assumptions are sketched but no practical
matter is looked into. Estimation strategies and specifications of utility functions
will be addressed in later chapters.
2.1 Unitary Model
The unitary model considers the household, consisting of two members (a husband m
and a wife f), as one decision-making unit with a single utility function to maximize
and a set of stable and transitive preferences. The idea is based on the basic static
individual labour supply model with the only difference that the individual is now a
household. Individual preferences and demands of household members are neglected
since only considered in aggregate. Furthermore the variables consumption, leisure
and working hours should be understood as household measures. Moreover solely
household income is examined independent of who contributes what share to it.
Later practice can be justified under the assumption that the source of income does
not influence the household’s choices in matter of labour supply and consumption.
This so-called income pooling assumption is a core feature of the unitary model. It
is also testable and thereby serves as a mean to judge the validity and applicability
of the model. This will be checked for the Austrian data used in a later chapter.
In the most basic unitary model the household’s preferences are assumed to be de-
fined over two types of goods, namely consumption goods c, and time spent outside
the labour market (leisure) lf and lm. By arguments of the Hicks composite com-
modity theorem, the consumption goods can be treated as a single commodity since
the group of prices move in parallel. Without loss of generality, the price of this
commodity c can be set equal to 1. The preferences over consumption and leisure
are formally represented in an utility function U that is twice continuously differen-
tiable, increasing in its arguments and quasi-concave.
The total amount of time available per person is denoted as T and consists of the
sum over the working hours (hf , hm) and leisure (lf , lm).
Apart from the income that is obtained by working at a deterministic and exoge-
nous gross wage of wf and wm, the household may receive an after-tax non-labor
income y. If we define q = (c, lf , lm)
′ as the leisure and consumption bundle and
p = (1, wf , wm)
′ as the full price vector of the household, the maximization problem
can be written as:
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maxq U(q)
subject to p′q = c+ lfwf + lmwm = y + wfT + wmT
The constraint, referred to as the full income constraint, arises from a combination
of time and budget restrictions that are respectively, T = hi + li for i = m, f and
c = y + wfhf + wmhm.
The maximization of the above problem results in a set of differentiable Marshallian
commodity and leisure demand (and implicitly labour supply) functions in the form
of q = g(y + wfT + wmT, p). These are due to the utility maximization restricted
to fulfil the following observable restrictions:
• Adding up condition: p′g(y + wfT + wmT, p) = y + wfT + wmT
This rather natural condition states that total demand equals total expendi-
ture.
• Homogeneity of degree zero: g(λ(y+wfT +wmT ), λp) = g(y+wfT +wmT, p)
with λ ∈ R++
If all prices and the household’s total income are multiplied by any number
λ > 0, its budget set remains unchanged. And, since the set of bundles from
which the household can choose is not changed, the same bundle should still
be chosen.
• Symmetry of the Slutsky Matrix: S = S ′ where S = dg
dp′ +
dg
d(y+wfT+wmT )q′
The compensated cross price and cross wage effects are symmetric. Symmetry
of latter excludes the possibility that lf is a complement (substitute) for lm
while lm is not a complement (substitute) for lf .
• Slutsky Matrix is negative semi-definite: x′Sx ≤ 0
This requires the wage response of the compensated labour supply to be non-
negative.
It has been shown by Hurwicz and Uzawa [12] that these four conditions are neces-
sary as well as sufficient for the integrability, which guarantees that by integrating
the demand functions the utility function can be recovered.
As mentioned this is a simple form of the unitary model. Other specifications
explicitly include household production (see for example Hallberg [15]). This exten-
sion allows for better understanding of how non-market time is allocated between
various time uses. In the above setting taxation has not been taken into account
implicitly since wages and non-labour income were assumed to be after-tax already.
When working with gross income the taxation system has to be modelled in order
8
to define the budget constraint as done by Beninger and Laisney [6].
Even though this model is well established and still frequently used in research it
was proven to have its flaws. First of all the main idea that the household can be
treated as a single decision making unit conflicts with the microeconomics’ credo
that individual behaviour should be the centre of attention.
Supporters of the unitary approach have used Becker’s rotten kid argument stating
that even if not every member of the household is altruistic, the non-altruistic mem-
bers still have an incentive to maximize the household’s income rather than their
own. This holds however only under rather strong assumptions.4 In older papers,
like the 1965 paper by Kauder [17], the household’s decision is assumed to coincide
with that of a household leader. This perception of how a household reaches its
decisions should however be out-dated.
In general the unitary model can be criticized in many ways due to its lack of theo-
retical foundations. For a more explicit discussion thereof see Chiappori [11].
Apart from the methodological controversy, the unitary model has an undeniable
weakness when it comes to discussing welfare economics.
Since the household is treated as a black box, inequality, power allocations and
other intra-group characteristics are ignored. These issues are however crucial when
it comes to policymaking, for example when addressing issues like divorce laws. A
critical view on that is presented by Apps and Rees [1].
Assumptions necessary for the unitary model to hold could not always find empirical
support. First of all the hypothesis of income pooling has been rejected in several
studies5. Besides the assumption of symmetry of the Slutsky matrix, which means
that the marginal compensated wage changes of two individuals in a household have
the same effect on each other’s labour supply, has been rejected in some studies such
as Kooreman’s [19].
2.2 Collective Model
Due to the discussed deficits of the unitary model an alternative one, called the col-
lective model, has been established. One of the most influential contributions was
made by Chiappori [10] whose basic model will be the starting point of the following
discussion.
In contrast to the unitary model, the collective model focuses on the decision process
within the household. It allows for individual preferences inside a household and
addresses power distribution. As in the unitary model one simplistically considers a
4Necessary assumptions are a specific decision process and a transferable utility function.
5Papers that reject this hypothesis have been published among others by Attanasio and Lechene
[3], Thomas [23] and Phipps and Burton [21].
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two-member household in a three-good economy (labour supply of both household
members, (hm, hf ) and consumption c). The total time available for each individual
is again T and leisure is as before labelled by lm and lf .
The central assumption of the collective model is the pareto-efficiency of allocations.
An allocation is said to be pareto-efficient among all possible choices (over leisure
and consumption which satisfy the budget constraint) if one individual’s welfare
cannot be increased without decreasing the welfare of the other household’s mem-
ber. Chiappori and Browning [9] justify this assumption by arguing that one may
interpret the decision-making process as a repeated game with perfect information
about the other’s preferences. This should allow the individuals to reach a pareto-
efficient outcome. Furthermore the authors mention that the unitary model assumes
households to maximize their utility, which can be generalized to pareto-efficiency.
Thus the restriction is not less realistic than the one of maximizing utilities.
While Chiappori assumes pareto-efficiency, other authors model a concrete bargain-
ing process, which may be cooperative or non-cooperative. Most of these bargaining
rules assume pareto efficiency as well, which makes the Chiappori model a super-
group of more concrete specifications.
He distinguishes two types of households: those with egoistic and those with al-
truistic members.6 Therefore the preferences of one individual might depend not
only on one’s own leisure and consumption but also on the partner’s. According to
Chiappori egoistic and altruistic preferences allow us to draw the same conclusions
which justify focusing on either one of them.
Taking into account the pareto-efficiency assumption without specifying a concrete
bargaining process, the maximization problem of member i takes the form
maxci,li Ui(ci, li)
subject to U−i(l−i, c−i) ≥ U−iwhere −i = m if i = f and −i = f if i = m
and (wm + wf )T + y ≥ cm + cf + wmlm + wf lf
where U−i is some required utility level of the partner that depends on wages and
non-labour income. Household member i maximizes her/his utility taking into ac-
count the budget restriction and optimising in order to maintain a pre-allocated
utility level of the partner.
An alternative representation follows from applying the second fundamental theo-
rem of welfare economics, which states in its general form that out of the infinity of
all possible pareto-efficient outcomes one can achieve any particular one by enacting
6The utility derived with respect to the other’s consumption and leisure is 0 for the egoist and
positive for the altruist.
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a lump-sum wealth redistribution and then let the market take over.
In the labour supply context Chiappori explains household behaviour (still with lin-
ear budget restriction) in two stages using an explicit sharing rule for the unearned
income. In the first stage the household members split the total non-labour income
y.7 The decision on how to split the whole amount is assumed to depend on wages
and amount of non-labour income that the individual contribute initially. The pa-
rameter indicating the share is given for member m by µm = µ(wm, wf , ym, yf ) and
thus for f by µf = ym + yf − µ(wm, wf , ym, yf ). It is possible to transfer nothing
at all but also to give one’s partner more than her/his non-labour income. In the
second stage each member independently chooses consumption and labour supply
subject to the corresponding budget constraint, which reads for egoistic preferences
as
maxci,li Ui(ci, li)
subject to wiT + µi(wm, wf , ym, yf ) ≥ ci + wili ∀i = f,m
The non-labour income weights can be understood to represent the amount of bar-
gaining power a member has in the intra-household allocation process. The shares
are not fixed but vary with changes in wages, non-labour income and prices. This
again will affect labour supply and consumption. It follows that the source of in-
come does matter, hence the income pooling hypothesis that is made in the unitary
model does not hold. However the demand functions that are obtained as solutions
to the maximization problem are still assumed to be continuously differentiable, ho-
mogeneous of degree 0 and adding up to full income.
Chiappori proves in one of his papers [11] that the two discussed representations
are equivalent and the existence of a sharing rule implies that the collective decision
process is efficient. In order to obtain the household allocation problem, the indi-
vidual maximization problems can now be combined to
maxcf ,cm,lf ,lm µf (wm, wf , y, p) Uf (cf , lf ) + µm(wm, wf , y, p) Um(cm, lm)
subject to (wm + wf )T ≥ cm + cf + wmlm + wf lf
As a household the aim is to maximize the (weighted) average of the individual
preferences.
It should be noticed that shifts in the bargaining power caused by changes in wages,
prices or non-labour income may affect household consumption and labour supply.
7It should be noticed, that in the applied part non-labour income will be replaced by consump-
tion.
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Since household preferences are no longer constant but depend on these variables it
is not straightforward how to obtain a rational complete and transitive household
preference ordering. The restrictions that could be imposed on the demand func-
tions in the unitary model can no longer be assumed to hold. The Slutsky matrix
will in general not be symmetric and negative semi-definite anymore since the utility
function is now price and wage dependent (see Kalman, [16] and Pollak [22]).
Chiappori however derived in his 1988 paper similar non-parametric restrictions that
also allow one to draw conclusions on integrability and uniqueness of the sharing
rule in the collective setting. Specifically he requires the leisure demand (or labour
supply) functions to fulfil some restrictions (similar to the Slutsky conditions) on
a set of partial differential equations and inequalities.8 These testable restrictions
are sufficient to prove that the sharing rule can be uniquely defined up to an ad-
ditive constant and allow identifying individual preferences. Therefore if the data
seems to support the conditions, the collective model allows to draw conclusions
on the intra-household decision making process and the individual preferences.9
A weakness of Chiappori’s model is that it solely accounts for inner solutions to
the problem and thereby excludes the possibility of non-participation in the labour
market. More advanced models, among others by Vermeulen [25] and Blundell et
al [7] allow for unemployment (by choice). The latter paper also introduces further
refinements such as binary choices of males (work or not work) since data shows that
a huge majority of all men work full time if they participate in the labour market.
Moreover Chiappori’s setting does not consider the possibility of non-linear (convex)
budget sets. This shortcoming has been addressed by Donni ([14]).
Household production called for further attention and found consideration in Apps
and Rees ([2], [1]).
Next to pointing out the differences between unitary and collective models, it should
be mentioned that in some special cases the former reduces to the latter. One such
case is that both household members have identical preferences over leisure and
consumption. Alternatively, if the household’s preferences are indeed defined by the
household leader, so that her/his bargaining power is 1, both models coincide. The
same occurs if the bargaining power divide remains fixed between the members, then
the household can be treated as an individual with separable preferences.
The above discussion focused on alterations that shift the bargaining power within
the model parameters. Clearly the bargaining power can also be influenced by extra-
8Additionally one has to assume therefore that the demand functions are three times continu-
ously differentiable and that µ is twice continuously differentiable.
9According to Chiappori [10] the same conclusion can be drawn under altruistic (caring) pref-
erences.
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household environmental parameters such as taxation and divorce laws.
In order to better understand how these models can be used, we will look at applica-
tions using data. This data will be discussed in the next section, before estimations
are carried out.
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3 Estimation of Labour Supply Models
In this section properties of labour supply models are described. First model as-
sumptions and utility function properties are addressed that will hold for both speci-
fications of households. Thereafter an appropriate estimation method, the maximum
likelihood, specifically the conditional logit model, is introduced. This estimation
method provides the theoretical base for the empirical conclusions in later sections.
These general topics that apply to both models are followed by properties that are
specific to the perception of a household. In the empirical estimation of the unitary
and the collective model certain steps are required that will be discussed first, before
they are estimated using data.
This chapter should support the understanding of labour supply models and thereby
clarify the estimation procedures in later steps.
3.1 Static Labour Supply Model
In this subsection the static labour supply model will be sketched. It is the underly-
ing basic theory of all labour supply model specifications that are discussed in this
paper.
The labour supply model describes how every person decides on how to divide their
limited time between working and leisure. Time spend on the labour market brings
income that can be used for consumption, which in turn gives people satisfaction.
Leisure in contrast does not create any income, it is however assumed to be associ-
ated with satisfaction as well.
For simplification we consider an individual that can work as much or as little as
she/he wants at a certain wage without facing any fixed costs of working.
As the well-being is increasing in leisure and income, while the individual faces a
time constraint, the same level of satisfaction can be obtained by various combi-
nations of both. This level, in economic terms called utility, can be obtained by
different shares of leisure and consumption. This trade-off is described by the so-
called indifference curves. The slope of this curve tells us the amount of income one
is willing to give up in order to spend one more hour not working. The absolute
value of the slope, the marginal revenue, is decreasing in leisure. This means that
the more leisure you already have, the less income you will give up to have more of
it.
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Figure 1: Static labour supply model
The more distant the indifference curve is from the origin the higher is the utility
level along this curve.
In order to find the highest yieldable utility for a person we need to consider her/his
budget constraint. This constraint is defined by wage, non-labour income and total
time available. The intersection with the y-axis describes the highest possible in-
come that is obtained if all the time available is spent on working. The intersection
with the horizontal axis describes the maximum available time that can be spent on
leisure only. All the other points along this line describe the possible leisure-working
hours combinations that are feasible. Choices within the triangle are possible how-
ever inefficient while choices above the budget constraint are infeasible.
The optimal choice is thus made on a point on the budget constraint line where it
touches an indifference curve. If the budget line would be a secant of the indiffer-
ence curve, a higher curve could be reached that is more distant from the origin and
guarantees a higher utility. Curves with a higher utility than the tangent one can
not be reached under the budget constraint.
We can conclude that the utility maximizing working hours choice is given in the
point where the slope of the indifference curve, the marginal rate of substitution,
equals the ratio of the marginal utilities of leisure and income which is nothing else
than the wage, which in turn is the slope of the budget constraint.
This basic setting can be easily extended to describe more realistic settings. For
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example a non-labour income can be introduced that shifts the budget constraint
up by the amount of extra money. Then corner solutions (in contrast to the tan-
gency ones) are possible that explain why some peoples’ optimal choice is to remain
unemployed.
This setting allows us to consider effects of policies. If for examples wages decrease,
the budget line will become less steep. It will intersect the vertical axis at a lower
point (smaller maximum income) while the intersection with the horizontal axis will
remain unchanged. This effect is known as the income effect. Since the amount of
leisure one would give up for additional income changed as well10 also another effect
takes place, the so-called substitution effect.
This is the theoretical base for understanding working hours choice reactions of
people (households in case of unitary model). In order to model them concretely,
specific utility functions need to be assumed that define the shape of the indiffer-
ence curves. Moreover necessary model assumptions need to be introduced as will
be done in the following subsection.
3.2 Model Assumptions
For both the collective and unitary model, only information about households con-
sisting of more than one person is of interest, as the aim is to compare multi-person
household representations.
In both models discrete working hours are used. The advantage of the discrete ap-
proach is that it reflects the reality better, since workers can usually choose between
few working hours options rather than having a continuous labour supply choice.
Most often the choice is even more restricted to either working part- or full-time.
Still, in order not to limit the choice set too much, four categories namely 0, 20, 40,
60 hours have been allowed. They are defined in such a way that choices between 0
to 10 count as 0; 10 to 25 as 20; 25 to 50 as 40 and everything above 50 as 60 hours.
The discrete specification also found support in literature. For example Van Soest,
Woittiez and Kepteyn [24] show that compared to the continuous specification the
discrete one can significantly improve the representation of the actual labour supply.
It is also important to mention that we disregard the demand side completely in this
work. It is assumed that every individual can choose from the same set of working
hours and the availability of these is assumed provided. Certainly labour market
studies need to consider both sides. Micro simulations that model a policy are as
well required to look into potential changes on the demand side and, based on both,
10Since the slope of the budget curve changed, the tangent with the indifference curve will not
be parallel to the old one but will touch the curve in another angle now.
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draw conclusions on the effect the policy might have on the labour market. As this
paper is not aiming at fully portraying the labour market, only the representation
of the supply side is studied.
Another strongly simplifying assumption made is that the hourly wage is indepen-
dent from the choice of working hours. The calculated hourly wage that is obtained
by the stated income and working hours11 is thought as being constant for each sub-
ject. This is clearly not fully reflecting reality. Including wage differences according
to the working hours choice would however go beyond the scope of this paper.
Children living in the household are not considered to have their own preferences.
They are not directly included in the household utility function. The number of
children and their age will however serve as an explanatory variable later on, which
allows us to draw conclusions on how they influence their parents’ labour supply
choices and thus their utility. In case of the unitary model, preferences of kids
are not relevant since the household is perceived as a single decision-making unit
anyway. For the collective model various strategies could be considered of how to
include children in the household structure. The sharing rule would need to be re-
fined and a utility function for the child needs to be constructed.
Extending the collective model by age-dependent utility functions of children goes
however beyond the scope of this paper.
As in most economic studies the utility maximizing assumption has to be made.
Concretely all subjects are assumed to have chosen the working hours as stated,
based on maximizing their utility in a perfectly rational way. Without this as-
sumption the best (in sense of utility maximizing) working hours choice can not be
observed, thus the data can not be used to understand choice as a utility maximizing
behaviour.
3.3 Utility Function Properties
Theoretical Implementation: The first step required for estimation is to specify
a utility function that explains labour supply behaviour. As utility is nothing
that can be observed there is not one correct formula to compose the well be-
ing of an individual. Several specifications coexist in literature that certainly
have to fulfil some indisputable properties of well-being. The utility should
increase in leisure and consumption, and the marginal utility of both should be
decreasing. Furthermore a term that captures trade-offs between leisure hours
should be included. The resulting utility function should be quasi-concave in
the observed labour supply.
11If no information was available the wages have been obtained from the Heckman procedure.
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Econometric Utility Model: If we step back from the purely theoretical repre-
sentation for a moment, we need to realize that in practice the determinants of
anyone’s behaviour can of course never be known with certainty. It is impos-
sible to capture all the variables that may influence our working hours choice,
which is respected by the econometric model (for individual i choosing j) in
the following form
U∗i,j = U(j|Xi,j) + i,j = Ui,j + ij
where U∗ is the measured utility and  is the error term that captures unob-
served influences determining the choice but also measurement and optimiza-
tion errors in the explanatory variables. The error terms are assumed to be
independently and identically distributed and, as the model will be estimated
by maximum likelihood, we need to assume a specific distribution of the 
terms. This assumption leads to the probability distribution over possible
choices; therefore the result of maximum likelihood estimation will never be
one clear resulting choice but a set of likelihoods that a certain decision will
be taken.
3.4 Conditional Logit Model
The maximum likelihood estimation procedure is based on a likelihood function,
which is similar to a probability function, with the difference that the parameters
defining the function are not given but the outcome (observed data) is. Practically
for every set of possible parameter values the likelihood function calculates how
likely it is that one would observe the data that was actually observed if these val-
ues were the true population parameters.
In principal every model can be estimated by maximum likelihood approach. It
turns out to be especially useful when dealing with discrete choice models as in case
of our labour supply problem.
Depending on the assumed distribution of the error terms the multinomial12 max-
imum likelihood estimation can be further classified. The two commonly assumed
distributions are the normal one (the class of probit models) and the standard type
I extreme value distribution (logit models). In the present context the logit model
shows to be highly tractable and will therefore be used. In its standard versions
the logit model uses individuals’ characteristics to explain the dependent variable.
If next to individual specific variables also alternative specific differences should be
considered, the conditional logit model should be used. In this setting this means
that not only characteristics like age, years of employment and other person related
12Distributions are called multinomial if more than two outcomes are possible.
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data, but also variables that vary for each individual according to the alternative
(working hours category), like available income13, are used to explain the labour
supply choice.
One downside of the conditional logit model is that it assumes no correlation between
unobserved factors over alternatives. This property leads to strange substitutions
between alternatives, called independence of irrelevant alternatives. An estimation
technique that considers this problem is the mixed logit model. Mixed logit models
not only allow the errors to display some randomness but also the coefficients, which
represents randomness in the taste variation over people and correlation across alter-
natives. The reasons why the conditional logit model has been chosen for estimation
anyway will be discussed in later sections when addressing concrete implementations
and results.
As the conditional logit model will be the main estimation method used in this
paper, its principles will now be introduced.
As before we suppose that the utility for individual i associated with choice j is
Uij = X
′
ijβ + ij
The probability that subject i will choose alternative j, meaning that option j
(Yi = j) yields the highest level of utility, is Pij = P (max(Ui,−j, Uij)) = Uij as
derived by McFadden[20]. Since we assume that the error terms identically and
individually follow a standard type I extreme value distribution with a cumulative
density function of
F () = exp(−exp(−))
and a corresponding probability density of
f() = exp(−)exp(−exp(−))
the probability that subject i chooses alternative j is
Pi,j = P (Yi = j|Xi,0, ..., Xi,J) =
exp(X ′i,jβ)∑J
l=0 exp(X
′
i,lβ)
for j = 0, ..., J . This can easily be understood if we examine the probability that
alternative 0 will be chosen. Choosing this option tells us that the utilities of working
any positive amount (work) would be smaller than the utility of staying out of the
13The simulated available income at each labour hours choice is calculated considering alternative
specific transfers and benefits.
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labour market. Formally this means
U∗i,0 > U
∗
i,work <=> X
′
i,0β+i,0 > X
′
i,workβ+i,work <=> i,0+X
′
i,0β−X ′i,workβ > i,work
Combining this result and the assumption that  follows the distribution F as defined
above, the probability that this happens is F (i,0 + X
′
i,0β − X ′i,workβ). The term
work represents of course the three categories of 20, 40 and 60 working hours and
thus the probability that 0 is chosen should be calculated conditional on the case
that all other utilities are smaller than U∗i,0. Since we assume that the error terms
are independently distributed we can multiply the CDFs to obtain the conditional
probability. The CDFs are just the integrated PDFs with the integral boundaries of
−∞ to the argument of F (.). These steps are recaptured in mathematical language
as
P (Yi = 0|Xi) = P (U∗i,0 > U∗i,20, U∗i,0 > U∗i,40, U∗i,0 > U∗i,60)
= P (i,0 +X
′
i,0β −X ′i,20β > i,20, ..., i,0 +X ′i,0β −X ′i,60β > i,60)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ b20
−∞
∫ b40
−∞
∫ b60
−∞
f(i,0)f(i,20)f(i,40)f(i,60)di,0di,20di,40di,60
=
∫ ∞
−∞
exp(−i,0)exp(−exp(−i,0))exp(−exp(−i,0 −X ′i,0β +X ′i,20β))...
exp(−exp(−i,0 −X ′i,0β +X ′i,60β))di,0
=
∫ ∞
−∞
exp(−i,0)exp[−exp(−i,0)− exp(−i,0 −X ′i,0β +X ′i,20β))...
−exp(−i,0 −X ′i,0β +X ′i,60β)]di,0
=
exp(X ′i,0β)∑J
j=0 exp(X
′
i,jβ)
where i,0+X
′
i,0β−X ′i,20β = b20, i,0+X ′i,0β−X ′i,40β = b40 and i,0+X ′i,0β−X ′i,60β =
b60. In exactly the same way the probability that 20, 40 and 60 working hours are
chosen can be derived.
The likelihood function is not meant to represent one household only but should
indicate the likelihood that each and every household takes a certain decision. This
means that the likelihood function is the multiplication of P (Yi = hours|Xi) over
all households i = 1, ...I: ΠIi=1
exp(X′i,hoursβ)∑
hours exp(X
′
i,hoursβ)
. The log likelihood function for the
conditional logit model can then be written as
I∑
i=1
(
J∑
j=0
I(Yi = j)Xijβ − ln(
J∑
j=0
exp(Xijβ)))
where I(.) is an indicator function and as before j ∈ 0, 20, 40, 60 stands for the
working hours choice and i = 1, ...I identifies the subject. This is the function that
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will be maximized by solving the system of equations resulting from the derivatives of
the log likelihood function with respect to the β. These solutions are most often not
easy to obtain as they are non-linear functions and thus they are usually calculated
numerically by statistic programs using optimization algorithms.14 These start at
an initial value and move in the direction of the parameter space that yields a higher
likelihood value.
3.5 Specifics of the Unitary Model
Up till now only general remarks about labour supply estimations have been made
that are valid for both, the unitary and the collective model. In this chapter the
attention lies on specifics of the unitary model only. This implies that now we un-
derstand the household as a single decision-maker with a single utility function.
As already mentioned, utility functions need to fulfil several criteria, but the re-
searcher still has the choice of specification. The most common specifications in the
labour supply context are the quadratic and the translog ones. These two will be
discussed shortly now.
Quadratic Utility Function: The quaratic utility function which has been used
in studies as by Keane and Moffit [18] and Ducan and Giles [8] has the following
form
U∗ = βcc+βmlm+βf lf+βcsc2+βmsl2m+βfsl
2
f+βcfclf+βcmclm+βfmlf lm+βDD+
where c is the household consumption and lf and lm are respectively the hours
of leisure of the female and male part of the household. D includes variables
containing information about the couple that may influence the working hours
choice of both partners and their consumption behaviour. More specifically
they are cross-terms of labour (or leisure), consumption, personal and house-
hold characteristics such as education, number and age of children, own age,
province and more.
Diminishing returns of consumption and leisure are considered by the quadratic
function with the marginal utility of income
∂U
∂c
= βc + 2βcsc+ βclf lf + βclmlm
and the marginal utility of male leisure of
∂U
∂lm
= βm + 2βmslm + βcmc+ βfmlf
14For example the iterative Newton method.
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There is of course a complementary relationship between consumption and
leisure since a higher consumption (more income) can only be obtained with
more working hours and therefore less leisure.
Translog Utility Function: Another often-used function is the translog one which
includes logarithmised variables
U∗ = βc ln c+ βlm ln lm + βlf ln lf + βcs (ln c) = +βlms (ln lm) =
+ βlf s (ln lf ) = +βclm ln c ln lm + βc lf ln c ln lf + βDD + 
where the marginal utility of consumption is
∂U
∂c
=
βc + 2 βcs ln c+ βc lm ln lm + βc lf ln lf
c
and the derivative with respect to leisure of the male part is
∂U
∂lm
=
βc lm + 2 βlm s ln lm + βc lm ln c
lm
Since consumption and leisure can never be zero per definition there is no risk
of taking the logarithm of 0. If we would take labour instead this could cause
a problem.
In case of the translog specification D is the cross-term of characteristics with
the logarithm of either consumption or leisure. Which of these will be used
since showing a significant effect, will be discussed now.
3.6 Specifics of the Collective Model
As already mentioned the main difference between the collective and the unitary
model is that the collective model understands the household as a sum of individ-
uals. As such both partners in a household have their utility function that they
would like to maximize. In order to obtain the budget constraint for each utility
maximization problem, the intra-household decision process that can be fully sum-
marized by the sharing rule has to be considered. The sharing rule, that describes
the power distribution between man and woman in a household, indicates how the
household income will be split between the partners. This then defines how much
each household member can consume. Using this maximum consumption in the
budget constraint allows the household member to solve his/her own utility maxi-
mization problem.
How to obtain the shares between the partners is up to the researcher as there
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is not one unified way to calculate it. Explanatory variables that seem suitable are
income of partners, their income potential (i.e. hourly wage), non-labour income,
education and age. Even the body mass index has been used to explain power shares
[5]. The sharing rule can either be a simple ratio of an observable variable for man
and woman but could also steam from an advanced regression model. We will use
various calculation methods in chapter 5 that of course lead to different predictions
of consumption shares.
Once the power shares are estimated for every household, the utility function of each
partner can be maximized. As in the unitary model different utility specifications
are possible. In accordance to the former discussion, the functional forms discussed
are the translog and the quadratic function.
Quadratic Utility Function
U∗ = βcici + βili + βcisc
2
i + βisl
2
i + βciici li + βfmlf lm + βDiDi + i
with the variables as introduced as above for i = f,m.
Translog Utility Function
U∗ = βci ln ci+βli ln li+βcis (ln ci) = +βlis (ln li) = +βcili ln ci ln li+βDi Di+i
again for i = f,m.
Either of the utility specifications can be used to estimate the utility level that each
of the working hours choice provide.
If one is for example only interested in the female labour supply behaviour this result
might be sufficient.
As the objective of this paper is to explain the household labour supply choice,
we should find a probability distribution over all possible combinations of men and
women’s working hours choices in order to compare it with the unitary model pre-
dictions. This can be done by generating a household utility, which is created by
combining the likelihoods that the partners go for a certain choice that leads to a
probability distribution that certainly sums up to 1.
In chapter 5 we will see how these steps can be translated empirically. Before
that we should become familiar with the data that will be used to do so.
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4 Data
4.1 Data Set
In order to allow for a comparison between the two approaches beyond the theoret-
ical level, the EU-SILC data for Austria from Statistik Austria (drawn from 2004
to 2006) are examined.
Austria together with five other countries launched the EU-SILC project in 2003 and
nowadays the EU-SILC survey is conducted by all member states of the European
Union. It therefore provides a well-comparable overview of income-levels, poverty
and other living conditions across countries.15 Moreover, since many households
are interviewed for four years, changes on individual and household level can be
observed as well.
This international survey program has been established in order to compare social
cohesion between countries. It should allow the European Union to do research on
social inclusion, health issues, gender wage gaps and pensions that in turn should in-
spire new policies. The survey contains a rich amount of economic and sociographic
variables that are yearly collected for several thousands of households and individ-
uals. The main focus of the survey lies on gathering information about housing,
labour, health, demography and education. The questionnaire collects information
on a yearly basis. Additionally every year one target research topic (module) is
issued that calls for extra specific data.
Income and other work-related variables are collected only for subjects aged 16 and
older. Information about children is gathered using a special questionnaire. All
variables are presented in both cross-sectional and longitudinal components. EU-
SILC provides data about people with all kinds of marital status. This paper will
however focus on couples. Single data will only be used to gather information about
behaviour of singles in order to identify parameters in the estimation for couples.
In total the questionnaire contains information about 4610 couples.
The data set includes a much-elaborated assortment of variables on the income
side. The information on individuals’ expenditures and even at the household level
are comparably limited. The survey includes information about benefits, different
sources of income and specific expenses, however none about general consumption.
The latter is neither given on an individual nor on a household base. In particular
for the analysis of the collective model this lack of detailed consumption data will
lead to inaccuracies as discussed later. However, since in 2010 the target research
question will be Intra-household sharing of resources, it can be assumed that in this
year’s survey more detailed questions about individual consumption behaviour will
be included.
15For more detailed information see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
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4.2 Description of Relevant Variables
Consumption proxy:
Consumption usually plays a decisive role in utility estimation. In the unitary model
one can use income as an alternative to consumption. This can however not be done
within a collective setting since the sharing rule, one desired result of the estimation
procedure, indicates how the income will be split within the household. Using income
as a replacement for consumption, one would explain an income-related variable by
income, which will lead to interdependencies and distorted results. Since no con-
sumption information is available in the EU-SILC data set, a variable that captures
the same (or at least a similar) behaviour should be used. An adequate variable to
take the place of consumption proved to be monthly housing expenses. This variable
captures rent, running costs, credit repayments, heating costs, maintenance and en-
ergy expenses. This seems to be a good approximation for consumption behaviour
of a household since it varies with the economic climate in a country. Moreover it
does not seem to be perfectly correlated with income, since the housing expendi-
tures vary strongly with the household type and lifestyle. When the distribution
of monthly income is compared to the housing expenses the difference is obvious.
The consumption proxy is nearly normally distributed while the monthly incomes
have two peaks. This could be due to part-time and full-time workers incomes (or
more general low-paid jobs versus high-paid jobs) that create two mass points in the
distribution, while housing is not offered in two price classes (or two sizes). General
consumption can be expected to behave similarly to housing expenses as some is
necessary (and prices are the same for everybody) and will not be proportional to
the income but will be distributed around an average. A clear downside of that
variable choice is that the housing costs are quite inflexible compared to the overall
consumption. Just because income increases (or decreases) a bit, one will not switch
to a more exclusive (or less expensive) flat. Therefore treating these expenses as a
proxy is not ideal but is the most suitable approximation available in the data set.
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Figure 2: Monthly housing expenses for people in relationships
Income, Working Hours and Hourly Wage:
Incomes are self reported by the individuals and since that information is rather
delicate there might be some misrepresentation. The working income is only stated
per year so that the hourly wage had to be calculated dividing the yearly income by
the denoted working hours. If the stated numbers were really unrealistic they were
excluded from the data set or set equal to 0 when the wage was below a certain
limit. When no wage was available for one year, and the household had taken part
in the survey already before, the wage was assumed to be the same but inflation-
adjusted. For unemployed people, or when there was just no information at all about
the income available, the hourly fictitious wages have been obtained via Heckmann
estimation. Since only wages of working individuals can be obtained and none of
the unemployed a selection bias exists. Assuming for example that some people do
not participate in the labour market because their reservation wage is above the
market wage, we are missing information concerning their valuation of leisure. The
Heckman procedure allows to circumvent the bias by predicting the missing wages
making use of person-specific characteristics.16 The estimation was done separately
for men and women. The inverse Mill’s ratio (selection coefficient) was significant
and positive for females, which implies that there indeed seems to be a selection on
the labour market for women.
16Person-specific variables are for example education, working experience, squared working ex-
perience, marital status, nationality, province.
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Figure 3: Wage distribution
There is a clear difference in average wage levels between men and women. The
lower average wage of women can however be due to lower education. In order to
check for that wages have been compared within education levels. The smallest
gender wage gap was found between highly educated subjects (men 19.14 Euros per
hour and woman 20.80 Euros). For intermediate and low education levels the gap is
much larger. Low educated men earn on average 3.8 Euros more than their female
colleagues, and intermediate education allows men to earn 3.7 Euros more. This
shows that equal work17 does not give women the same wage.
Wages will not be explicitly used in the estimation. They are however important
since they define not only the income but also the consumption.
Another obvious gender difference can be observed in the working hours. The
comparison between singles and couples reveals that women show a significantly
different behaviour when they are in relationships while male working hours seem
not to depend on the marital status.
17This can be concluded assuming that equal education implies equal productivity.
27
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
0 20 40 60 80 100
x
kdensity couple_f_w_hours kdensity single_f_w_hours
®
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
0 20 40 60 80 100
x
kdensity couple_m_w_hours kdensity single_m_w_hours
Figure 4: Working hours distribution for men and women depending on marital
status
This observed pattern might already suggest that women have a higher elasticity
concerning working hours when having a family.
The data set also shows that women work part-time much more often than men do
as can be seen in the graph that already puts the working hours in four categories
(0, 20, 40, 60 hours).
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Figure 5: Working hours distribution for men and women in four categories
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To see how education and the number of children affect the working hours, the
average hours for men and women in different categories are displayed in the follow-
ing table
Working hours
lf lm
low education 21.6 39
middle education 27.3 40.1
high education 28.1 40.8
no child 28.2 38.3
one child 21.9 40.2
children ≥ 2 14.6 41
We see that education seems to influence the working hours choice of women while
again it can be seen that men consistently choose to work full-time. The same be-
haviour is observed when the family size increases. With more children the mother
works less, while once again the father’s working hours alter only slightly.
Further Explanatory variables:
In order to explain working hours choice, personal characteristics are relevant. One
very important variable is the number of children living in the household and their
age. Because of that three variables have been created which indicate how many
children aged from 0 to 2, 3 to 5 and 6 to 10 live in the household. The relevance
of these variables is obvious since young children require a lot of care that can be
supplied by the parents (or one of them) or by an institution (depending on the age
group either nursery school, kindergarten, elementary school and after-school care
club). This implies children either influence the working hours negatively or they
incur certain care-related costs.
Further used explanatory variables are age and education. To predict the sharing
rule, differences in these variables will be used to explain the within-household dis-
tribution. Thereby the difference in education is built following a paper by Crespo
[13] in which he uses Spanish data.
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4.3 Modelling of Austrian Transfer-Benefit System
Many studies based on collective and unitary models use a very simplified taxation
scheme. In order to be able to interpret the results of policies, it is necessary to con-
sider and include all the taxes and benefits for every possible income and household
situation.
This whole system then defines the budget constraint for the individuals and house-
holds, thus the accurate modelling of the tax and benefit system is crucial in order
to draw conclusions from estimation results. When studying policies, the changes of
interest are implemented in the system and thereby it matches the available budget
with every person and every labour choice. The overall change in labour supply
then tells the researcher if the policy might have the expected result.
The research team around Dr.Zulehner has constructed this tax and benefit transfer
calculator for Austria. In the first step they calculated the social security taxes
depending on the occupational category and subtracted them from the stated gross
incomes. Thereafter the tax base has been calculated according to the various per-
sonal and labour-related characteristics and the total tax burden deducted. The
transfers are more complicated to capture, as some relevant information is not avail-
able. This happens for example for the unemployment payments, as no detailed
information about previous employment is included in the EU-SILC data. Other
transfers, as family and children allowances are straightforward to include. The so-
cial welfare benefits vary according to the province, which has been considered as
well. Moreover the child-care benefits have been modelled in the transfer calculator
which depends significantly on the province and if it is supplied privately or publicly.
The simulated income provides the model with the budget constraint but also gives
information about consumption behaviour. The resulting simulated consumption
was calculated multiplying the simulated income with the share of observed con-
sumption of total income for every household. This means that if household i con-
sumes x% of the total household income then it is assumed that if the household
income rises the adjusted consumption is x% of the new total income.
Even though not all details of the system could be implemented the most important
features of the Austrian tax-benefit scheme are captured.
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5 Estimation Results
5.1 Unitary Model Results
The labour supply estimation based on 4610 households led to the following results.
Translog specification
Variable Coefficient Std. Error P > |z|
ln c 19.55 1.68 0.0
ln lm 57.32 1.39 0.0
ln lf 25.76 1.26 0.0
(ln c)2 -1.23 0.087 0.0
(ln lm)
2 -7.47 0.17 0.0
(ln lf )
2 -3.24 0.154 0.0
ln c ln lm -0.87 0.104 0.0
ln c ln lf -0.804 0.112 0.0
agem ln lm 0.016 0.007 0.0
agef ln lf 0.09 0.007 0.0
k(0-2) ln lf 4.18 0.22 0.0
k(3-5) ln lf 1.97 0.169 0.0
k(6-10) ln lf 1.19 0.128 0.0
All the above coefficients are significant at a 5% level and allow us to draw the
following conclusions.
First of all we see that the consumption and the leisure time of each partner are
positively associated with the utility of the household. This result confirms our ex-
pectation. We also see that the husbands’ leisure seems to have a stronger positive
effect on the household utility than the women’s. Intuitively one might explain this
by considering an average household in which the woman works much less than her
partner and therefore he might have a higher marginal utility of working (smaller
marginal utility of leisure).
The quadratic terms for leisure and consumption have a significant negative effect
of utility, which combined with the observed linear positive effects means that the
utility is increasing in leisure and consumption up to a certain point, after which it
decreases with additional units. This result is as well what we expected to find.
The cross-terms of leisure times and consumption are significantly negative which
implies that the former moderates the effect the latter has on utility. An increase
in leisure carries fewer benefits if consumption is high. If consumption is low the
effect that leisure has on utility is higher. This result is a bit counter-intuitive, as
we would expect that with a high consumption one profits more from an additional
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unit of leisure. With less consumption one would assume there would be less need
of additional income, hence a smaller utility of working an additional hour.
With age the utility from leisure increases for both sexes. For women only, an
increased utility of leisure can also be observed if there are young kids in the house-
hold.
Quadratic specification
Variable Coefficient Std. Error P > |z|
c 0.005 0.001 0.0
lm 0.282 0.0097 0.0
lf 0.048 0.007 0.0
c2 -7.6e-06 0.000 0.0
(lm)
2 -0.004 0.000 0.0
(lf )
2 -0.001 0.000 0.0
c lm 7.6e-06 0.000 0.0
c lf 7.4e-06 0.000 0.0
agem lm 0.0005 0.000 0.0
agef lf 0.0017 0.000 0.0
k(0-2) lf 0.069 0.003 0.0
k(3-5) lf 0.033 0.002 0.0
k(6-10) lf 0.021 0.002 0.0
If we compare the results of the translog estimation with the quadratic one we
encounter many similarities. Again consumption and leisure are found to have a
positive influence on the utility of the household. The squared consumption, as well
as the squared leisure terms are slightly but significantly negative, which again in-
dicates that at a certain threshold of these variables further units have a decreasing
marginal utility.
The interaction term between consumption and leisure is found to be small but
positive, which, in contrast to the predictions of the translog model, supports our
intuitive understanding that leisure will be appreciated more if consumption is high.
Again the cross terms of women’s leisure and young kids and leisure and the age
show significantly positive results. This means that also for the quadratic utility
specification an increased appreciation of women for leisure is found when there are
many young kids in the household. Moreover leisure time seems to be valued higher
with age.
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Several different sets of explanatory variables have been estimated and the fit of
those has been compared using goodness of fit measures. Here are the most relevant
results.
Goodness of fit criteria
Translog Quadratic
Log likelihood (intercept only) -11464.65 -12773.316
Log likelihood (full model) -6825.02 -8743.1
Likelihood ratio- χ2(df) 9279.185 (13) 8060.1 (13)
Prob> LR 0 0
McFaden’s adjusted R2 0.404 0.314
AIC (intercept only) 3.307 3.801
BIC (intercept only) -20674.771 -21265.38
AIC (full model) 13676.1223 17512.536
BIC (full model) -9170.9 -7950.437
The first statistic in the table describes the log likelihood of the model with all
parameters but the intercept set to zero. After including the stated explanatory
variables the log likelihood increases in both models significantly (see second line).
We see that the fit became much better however this statistic does not allow us
to compare between the specifications but only within them (compare the fits of
translog models among themselves and quadratic models among themselves).
The same holds for the likelihood ratio (LR), which is just the difference between
twice the log likelihood of the full model minus twice the log likelihood of the re-
stricted model. The LR statistic, tests the null hypothesis that all coefficients except
the intercept equal zero, which is rejected for both specifications. The statistic is
χ2distributed with 13 degrees of freedom and once again can only serve as a com-
parison between nested models.
The regular R2 is not interpretable as it is only a valid measure in the OLS esti-
mation. McFadden came up with a similar measure that is applicable for discrete
choice models as well, the McFaddens adjusted R2. It is basically a likelihood ratio
index of the form
R2McF = 1−
ln Lˆ(full model)− k
ln Lˆ(intercept only)
with k as the number of parameters. The translog seems to have with 0.404 a higher
degree of explanation than the quadratic one with a pseudo R2 of 0.314.
In order to have an immediate feeling of the fit without running any tests, a counter
was implemented that to measure how often the labour hours choice predicted to
give the highest utility, actually coincided with the chosen working hours of the
households. This means that both man’s and woman’s working categories have been
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estimated correctly. This simple counter shows that 3.11% are predicted correctly
by the translog model while only 2.25% of the working choices could be explained
using the quadratic utility specification. These percentages appear to be small. It
should however be noted that the arrangement of the four labour choice categories
(0,20,40,60) have a huge influence here. Should their ranges be altered the fit of
the models might change significantly. Moreover both partners’ choices have to be
predicted correctly in order to count the prediction as correct.
The comparison between specifications shows, as we already saw for the McFaddens
R2, that the translog model can obtain a better fit.
In addition to the pseudo R2, the information measures AIC and BIC allow for com-
parison between non-nested models. The smaller the akaike information criteria, the
better the model fit. For the bayesian information criteria the opposite holds. A
more negative statistic is considered to point to the better fitting model. According
to both of these statistics the translog is once again the superior one.
To sum up the results in one line, the translog specification seems to explain the
data much better than the quadratic utility function does.
The following graphs allow a comparison between the predictions of both models
and the observed choices.
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Figure 6: Estimated working hours choices of quadratic utility model
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Figure 7: Estimated working hours choices of translog utility model
The assumption we made earlier that children do not have own preferences is quite
unrealistic. It might very well be possible that the household type (no children, one
child or many) does matter and the utility function (of either the household or the
parents’ ones) should be altered accordingly. In order to see if an adjustment ac-
cording to the household type could possibly improve the fit we compare the degree
of explanation for each number of children in the household. It turns out that in the
translog model the fit is the highest for families with more than 2 children.18 The
same is observed for the quadratic model.19 It seems that the both utility specifi-
cations are more suitable for larger families. This brings up an issue that could be
interesting to investigate in further research.
To be able to judge the results properly we should rethink our initial assumptions.
One of the most discussed ones is the income pooling assumption, which has already
been touched in the theoretical discussion of the model. It says that the origin of
income does not influence the choices of the households. This implies that con-
sumption increases by the same amount when the household income grows due to
a change in the woman’s or the man’s income. This again means that the marginal
18The fit of the translog model for childless couples is 3.12%, for household with one kid it
increases to 3.17%, with 2 to 3.18% and finally for couples with many kids the fit is 3.58%.
19For childless couples the fit is 2.13%, for families with one kid it increases to 2.22%, with two
kids to 2.43% and with more kids up to 3%.
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propensity to consume must be the same for the man and the woman in the house-
hold, thus equal to the household propensity to consume. In order to check for that,
regressions of consumption on household income are run for women in couples, men
in couples and households. The parameter estimates are tested for equality using a
t-test. The null hypothesis that they are insignificantly different must be rejected
at a 5% significance level. This is an indication that the propensity to consume for
men and women differs, and also the propensity of the household does not equal any
of the individual’s. As each equality hypothesis must be rejected, we have to reject
the income pooling one.
This tells us that the members of the household do not behave as one single decision-
maker, thus the unitary model and its results should be considered critically for the
EU-SILC data.
5.2 Collective Model Results
5.2.1 Constructive Approach
Now that results for the unitary model have been obtained, the interest lies in finding
out if the collective model can lead to an improved fit of the observed behaviour.
In this section we follow the estimation method as used by Beninger [5].
To obtain the utility of the working hours choices, he first estimates a sharing rule
that is based on several intra-household power indicators. He then uses this share
for every household to construct the consumption of each partner. This information
about consumption allows him to calculate the utility each household member has
at this consumption level and the working hour choice of interest.
Beninger’s approach will be explained in more details here and we will see the results
of this approach for the EU-SILC data.
The sharing rule for the EU-SILC data will be obtained regressing the wage-ratio
on other variables that explain intra-household bargaining powers. The wage-ratio
defined as,
wf
wf+wf
, is approximately normally distributed around 0.421.
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Figure 8: Wage ratio
One of the explanatory variables that will be used to explain the wage-ratio is
the potential contribution of the female to the household wealth. With Rf defined
as
Rf =
y40f
y40f − y40m
the potential contribution reads as
y40f =
∑
pjm(R
f40
mj −Rf0mj)
The term pm denotes the sample frequencies of discrete weekly labour supply of the
husbands. The obtained variable Rf fully captures the tax-benefit system.
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Figure 9: Potential contribution of women to household wealth
Instead of the wage-ratio Beninger uses another variable that should capture the
power distribution within the household, which is the potential income strength of
women defined as
ISf =
U feff − U fmin
U fmax − U fmin
where the maximum, minimum and efficient20 utility levels are obtained from the
predictions of the unitary model. This ratio should be bounded between 0 and 1
and can be understood as a measure of the potential income strength of the female
part of a couple.21 Unfortunately this ratio did not deliver any reasonable results for
Austrian data. Since the wage-ratio seems to be a plausible measure for the income
strength as well, this variable will be used instead.
In line with Beninger again, the sharing rule will be estimated as
ωm =
1
1 + expA
with
20The efficient utility is the one that is reached at the realized choice of working hours as we
assume that the individuals posses full information and are perfectly rational.
21The female power index is calculated solely for women with a partner.
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A = α0 + αwf wf + αwmwm + αww wf wm + αni hhni
+ αwfniwf hhni+ αwmniwm hhni+ αRf Rf + αdD
where hhni denotes the net income of a household and wf and wm label the hourly
wages of women and men respectively. D represents socio-demographic variables
like age, education and number of children. The logistic form guarantees that the
power estimates are bounded between 0 and 1.
These results are obtained by running an estimation of the wage-ratio (our tem-
porarily assumed sharing rule) on the wages, the wage interaction, the net incomes,
Rf , and several household characteristics. The estimation method used is GLM
(generalized linear models) which after comparison explains the wage-ratio best us-
ing Newton-Raphson optimization.
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Figure 10: Predicted sharing rule
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Using the obtained results the male consumption should be calculated by the
following formula:
cm = exp(
ωm(U
max
m − Uminm ) + Uminm − βml ln(lm)− βmll ln(lf )ln(lm)
βmc
+ c0 = Vm + c0
Here Uminm and U
max
m are obtained from a conditional logit estimation that is run
for single men. The parameter ωm is the predicted sharing rule (fitted values from
wage regression) since it is the share of males. The remaining parameters, βml , β
m
ll
and βmc have been obtained from other model estimations. Precisely β
m
l is taken
from the single men conditional logit estimation, and the interaction parameter βmll
came from a simple unitary household estimation.
We already notice that this method is quite artificial. We need to rely on many
assumptions such as the parameters estimates for singles being equal to people
living in a relationship. This assumption has often been rejected in studies and will
therefore be analysed here too. In order to test this assumption for the Austrian
EU-SILC data, the coefficients of consumption and leisure for men and women in
relationships, as well as singles, have been compared. Then regressions of choice on
leisure and regression of choice on consumption have been run by marital status.
Women in relationships seem to evaluate leisure more than single women. For men
the difference was insignificant at a 5% significance level.
Moreover no real comparison with the unitary approach is possible, as some ele-
ments are taken from this approach. If one is critical towards the unitary model, this
collective modelling approach is not really attractive. Additionally the construction
of the consumption term in the latest step is scale dependent on the utility. As
utility is not a measure that can be compared for different models, this approach
might lead to reasonable outcomes in Beninger’s study, however there should be
some doubt if this algorithm can be applied to any data set.
These flaws in the estimation procedure are also apparent for the EU-SILC data.
The predicted consumption levels for men are all in a small interval around 0.
This clearly does not reflect reality at all. The lack of generalisation in the consump-
tion formula might be due to the exponential expression. The interval of values that
can be the argument of the exponential expression becomes quite small if we would
like to obtain any reasonable consumption level as an outcome.
As no usable information for the consumption behaviour could be found, no utility
estimation can be done. Beninger’s approach did not lead to any result using the
EU-SILC data for Austria.
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5.2.2 Calibration Approach
The theoretical econometric approach that has just been discussed does not lead
to reasonable solutions, therefore the attention now shifts to another approach that
allows us to estimate the sharing rule, namely the calibration method.
Let the utility function be of the translog type
U∗i = βci ln ci + βli ln li + βlli ln lf ln lm + i
for i = f, m. For single men and women the leisure interaction term is set to zero.
By allowing people in a relationship to have this interaction term the separability of
the partners in a partnership is weakened. This specification of utility assumes that
the partners care about spending time together but not directly about the other’s
utility, which would also include the partner’s consumption.
In order to obtain the labour supply decisions based on these utility specifications,
one has to make two important assumptions. The first restriction is that we only
consider convex hulls. Concretely we assume that all households include all lotteries
over deterministic allocations (mixed strategies) to their domain of alternatives, and
that the partners negotiate beforehand the final allocations for all the states of the
economy and all the periods to come. This guarantees that the household chooses
globally efficient allocations.
The second assumption is that people do not change their preferences when they
are in a relationship. This allows us to use estimates of a conditional logit model
for single men and women without kids22 as proxies for preferences of people in a
partnership. Concretely the single models yield estimates that describe the influence
consumption and leisure have on the labour supply choice, and thus allow identifi-
cation, as will be shown in the following section. That this assumption could not
be supported by the data (as we discussed already in the last subsection) should be
kept in mind.
Identification: In total six preference parameters and the power index have to
be identified, βcf , β
l
f , β
c
m, β
l
m, βlli and respectively µ. Under the adding up
constraint, saying that the coefficient estimates of the utility model must sum
up to one, we can normalize the utilities such that
βci + β
l
i + βlli = 1 i = f,m
22Single parents are left out because their preferences might include utility components that are
related to their kid.
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The assumption that people do not change their preferences when living in a
couple implies that
βci
βli
=
γci
γli
= αi i = f,m
The two restrictions above can be stated together as βci =
1−βlli
1+1/αi
and βli =
1−βlli
1+αi
. The two household specific variables γ and µ are the ones that have to
be calibrated using the information about the actual chosen labour supply.
The power distribution variable µ has to lie between 0 and 1 as it is defined at
the percentage of power a partner has in a partnership. Contrary the leisure
interaction term γ is not bounded below from 0 but can not exceed 1. For
example, negative values seem reasonable for young parents that might prefer
not spending their leisure time together, as one has to baby-sit the kid while
the other might prefer to work meanwhile. According to Bargain and Moreau
[4] there is a minimum value the interaction term can take in order to still
fulfil the concavity restrictions on the individual utility functions. As stated
by Bargain and Moreau these are
γmin =
−1
(1 + αi)ln(lj − lminj)− 1 for i, j = f,m
If the identification assumptions are satisfied, the numbers calculated from
the ratio of the consumption and the leisure estimates can be used to calibrate
power and leisure interaction.
Econometric Estimation: Concerning the econometric estimation the paper uses
the mixed logit model, which in general has the advantage of accounting for
unobserved heterogeneity due to individual characteristics. Moreover the au-
thors introduce regimes (or mass points) at the most common working hours.
As it turned out that the mixed logit model does not lead to a clear improve-
ment of results compared to the conditional logit model, the latter was chosen
in this paper. Another reason why the conditional logit model was preferred
is that is takes very little time for its iterations compared to the mixed logit
one. This matters as these estimations are carried out multiple times during
the grid search.
Another argument against the authors’ approach is that the mass point might
reflect the observed labour behaviour, without having it explained by explana-
tory variables, but just imposed externally to improve the fit. On the one hand
the observations justify the praxis. Additionally the labour supply contract
situation that allows mainly the choice between full-time and part-time em-
ployment support the choice. On the other hand the mass points are not
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explained within the framework but are just a reproduction of the observed
structures. One could instead aim to find variables that serve as explanatory
tools to model labour supplies in a simple, straightforward way. The latter
approach, which is also used to model Austrian data, while dispensing with
copying observed structures, goes at the expense of goodness of fit.
Results: The grid search over the power value and the interaction term at the
same time shows that the interaction term has very small effect on the good-
ness of fit. This insensitivity of the leisure interaction term would imply that
the partners in a relationship do not really care if they spend a lot or little
time together, but solely on their consumption and their own leisure. This
discovery combined with the utility function for couples tells us that the only
interaction term between the partners falls away. The partner-component of
the utility function is insignificant, which means that partners behave just as
two independent individuals or that the utility function should be altered to
model their caring.
The unsuitability of the utility function is reflected in the resulting utility
maximizing power index. This is always one or zero depending on who has
the highest earning potential.
This lies in the form of the household utility function combined with the
insignificant leisure interaction term, which makes the partners’ utilities inde-
pendent from each other. As the overall household utility is just the weighted
sum over the individual utilities, Uh = µUf + (1 − µ)Um, the higher utility
should be weighted with one in order to maximize the sum.
Circumventing the problem a term has been included in the household utility
function that captures the altruism. As this could not be done in the individual
utility functions, the altruism will be modelled when merging the individual
utilities. The best way of including this term can be found by another grid
search.
First the income ratio between women and men,
incf
incm+incf
, is regressed on vari-
ous explanatory variables. In comparison to the above estimation, this at least
allows us to obtain very realistic power estimates, which are not one or zero but
well distributed around 51%. In a second step we use the obtained predicted
powers to infer the most appropriate altruism term. The maximizing function
type clearly is Uh = µUf + (1− µ)Um −
√|Uf − Um|. In contrast to the ini-
tially suggested definition of the utility function by Bargain and Moreau, this
form allows the partner to care about the other’s utility level. This implies not
only the leisure spent together but also the consumption level of the partner.
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Aiming to represent the altruism in a relationship, this specification seems
adequate to model the dislike of large material inequalities between partners.
The fit statistics (AIC, BIC, McFadden’s R2) cannot be compared to the
unitary model, as the conditional logit estimations are made for each partner
and not for the household. Moreover the individual fits can not explain the
fit of the household utility Uh = µUf + (1 − µ)Um −
√|Uf − Um| since the
interaction term is not considered.
One number that can be compared, though, is the percentage of cases where
the chosen working hours combination of a household equals the choice that
the model estimates to be utility maximizing. For the utility function with
the utility interaction term this degree of explanation is 5,05%. This means
that in around 5% of the cases the actual choice is equal to the predicted one.
If we compare this to the results from the unitary model23 we see that the fit
of the collective model is clearly better.
We can again plot the distribution of utility maximizing working hours choices
for couples as predicted versus the observed choices. The graphical represen-
tation shows as well that the collective model as defined above mimics the
behaviour better than the unitary models do.
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Figure 11: Estimated working hours choice versus observed one (with altruism)
23We had 3.11% in translog model and 2.25% in quadratic model.
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As before these estimations can be carried out separately for each household
type. Households without children have a degree of explanation of 6.25%,
families with one kid 6.24%, and households with two kids show a fit of 5.91%.
As in the unitary estimation the fit is the highest (with 6.15%) for households
with more than two children.
In many papers the inelastic male labour supply has been addressed. It seems
that men mostly work full time and their labour supply elasticity is very low
when wages change. The strong preference for working full-time is also notice-
able in the EU-SILC data set. This might have an immense negative effect on
the fit. In order to check for that, men’s working hours are set equal to their
actual choice. Now, given their partner’s labour choice, women’s preferred
working hours can be controlled for their fit. Compared to the estimation re-
sults for both sexes, the goodness of fit clearly increased to 13%. Conclusions
drawn are that women’s behaviour displayed in the data can be explained bet-
ter by the utility function chosen.
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Figure 12: Estimated working hours choice vs observed one for women only
If all men are fixed at working full time (40 hrs) the fit decreases to 10.7% for
women.
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6 Final Remarks and Conclusions
Labour supply estimations are an important tool for economists to advice policy
makers. The most often used model, the unitary one, considers the household as
one decision-making unit. This has the obvious downside that individual changes
cannot be estimated. A more technical weakness is the income pooling hypothesis
that creates the testable core of the unitary model but has been rejected in many
studies.
Theoretically the collective model that represents an alternative to the unitary model
seems more plausible since it does not treat the household as a black box but allows
for individual preferences. Implementing this model is however more difficult plus
it requires individual specific data.
The static labour supply model is the theoretical base of both models. Depend-
ing on the chosen utility function, the indifference curves take their shape. The two
most common utility functions are the translog and the quadratic ones. Including
logarithmised respectively quadratic terms they define combined with the budget
constraint the optimization problem.
The unitary model solves exactly this optimization problem for the household based
on one of these two utility functions. The results from the empirical part show that
the unitary model yields a fit of 3.11% using the translog model and 2.25% using the
quadratic model. The fit statistics such as AIC and BIC confirm that the translog
model describes the household’s behaviour better. The result for the translog model
suggests that women see a higher utility in staying at home if they have younger
children. For both sexes we can find a higher evaluation of leisure with age.
The fit of the unitary model is not overwhelming which might be due to the found
non-validity of the income-pooling hypothesis. The rejection of the hypothesis sug-
gests that it very well matters who contributes which share to the household income
and depending on the individual not cumulated income the working hours are chosen.
To see if the collective model allows us to estimate supply of labour better, two
estimation methods that perceive the household as a pair of individuals are car-
ried out. The first method that is based on Beninger’s paper [5]. This calculation
method, which uses several intermediate results of the estimation, did however lead
to unrealistic results. The calculation procedure was stopped at the consumption
levels since estimates for these were highly senseless.
The second collective estimation approach that is based on a calibration approach
makes us doubt the construction of the household utility. The grid search over the
leisure interaction leads to a result independent of this term. The variation of the
power values shows unreasonable results as well. This is due to the structure of the
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household utility. The results suggest rethinking the calculation of the collective
utility. The power values are therefore obtained by a regression of the income ratio
on several explanatory variables which estimate a power share of 51% for women.
Considering that the household utility could not be explained in its recommended
form, another grid search over possible formulas has been carried out. This suggests
that the collective utility should not only be a weighted sum but additionally in-
clude an interaction term of the individual utilities of the form
√|Uf − Um|. This
indicates that partners do care beyond their time spent together (if they even do).
They seems to worry about the other’s utility (which includes consumption as well).
This means that the labour supply of a household depends on the individual’s utility
but also on the inequality between partners. Working hours choices that are based
on this utility therefore depend on the consumption of the partner as well.
This approach leads to a fit of 5.05% which is a clear improvement compared to the
utility model results.
Literature but also the EU-SILC data set shows an inelasticity of male labour sup-
ply. To control for that, men have been fixed at their actual choice. As expected
this increases the fit significantly up to 13%.
We can conclude that the collective approach comes at the costs of problems in
the implementation. First of all information on individual levels is required so that
the collective approach can be carried out well. The estimates for the consumption
levels based on the housing expenses are not ideal and we assume that the fit suffers
from this imprecision. Presumably the EU-SILC data for 2010 will contain all these
relevant information, since the topic this year will be intra-household distribution.
Other possibilities to improve the degree of explanation would be to include the
utility of children, only consider binary choices of men (work versus not work) or
alter the discrete hours categories.
Considering all findings and difficulties one might advice the use of the unitary
model in case that household behaviour is of interest- due to its simplicity. In case a
policy is studied that is assumed to influence one partner more than the other, the
collective model should be used despite its more complicated estimation procedure.
The only way to tell one individual’s change in behaviour is to perceive the person as
such with her/his preferences. This might come at the cost of estimation hassle but
when the right approach is found it can possibly explain the underlying behaviour
much better.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to compare two approaches of estimating and modelling
the labour supply of a household. Hereby the central question will be if a household
can be seen as one decision making unit or if it should be perceived as two individ-
uals (most often wife and husband) each with her/his own preferences. The unitary
model captures the first perception while the collective model represents the two-
individuals household concept. Later requires more individual data and a sharing
rule needs to be calculated as one extra step. The two models will be explained and
compared at a theoretical and an econometric level.
In order to see the models applied to real data the EU-SILC data set for Austria
provided by Statistik Austria is used. Even though the data set is not perfect for the
collective model, it allows us to see advantages and disadvantages that both models
might have in empirical studies.
This paper uses a discrete hours approach that allows for four working hours cat-
egories and only considers multi-person households. The theoretical base for all
models is the static labour supply model and the estimation technique used will be
the conditional logit one. As these help to understand the estimation procedure,
they will find some attention in this work. Furthermore the data will be described
which allows us to immediately draw some interesting conclusions. Another central
piece of this work is the transfer-benefit calculator that translates gross into net
incomes.
The empirical results reject the income-pooling hypothesis that is the main assump-
tion of the unitary model. It further suggests that women appreciate leisure more
the more young children they have. Both partners enjoy leisure more with age.
The collective model estimation turns out to be quite cumbersome. It leads us to
doubt the construction of the household utility and so a utility interaction term is
included that punishes utility differences between partners.
Concluding it can be said that the collective model turns out to be less straightfor-
ward to estimate for the Austrian data. It however allows drawing conclusions on
an individual level, which is a crucial property.
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7.2 Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Arbeit betrachtet verschiedene Arbeitsangebotsmodelle und evaluiert
deren Scha¨tzgu¨te im theoretischen aber auch angewandten Sinne (basierend auf den
EU-SILC Daten 2004-2006 der Statistik Austria).
Die zwei Modelle die untersucht werden, sind unita¨re Haushaltsmodelle, welche
den Haushalt als einen einzelnen Entscheidungstreffer ansehen, und kollektive Mod-
elle, welche die Individuen als solche erkennen und zu einem Haushalt kombinieren.
Zuerst werden die theoretischen Grundlagen erla¨utert. Annahmen und Literaturu¨berblicke
werden besprochen. Dem folgend wird das statische Arbeitsangebotsmodel, das bei-
den Modellen zu Grunde liegt, erkla¨rt. Dabei handelt es sich um ein Nutzenmax-
imierungsproblem, welches auf Budgetrestriktionen und Nutzenfunktionen basiert.
Weitere Modellannahmen und Eigenschaften der empirischen Scha¨tzung werden
erla¨utert, unter anderem die verwendete Conditional Logit Scha¨tzmethode.
Vor dem empirischen Teil der Arbeit, werden die Daten begutachtet. Diese von der
Statistik Austria stammenden Daten, wurden von einer europaweiten Datenerhe-
bung namens European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions fu¨r die
Jahre 2004-2006 bezogen. Die relevantesten Variablen werden erkla¨rt und manche
Statistiken liefern bereits aufschlussreiche Resultate. Unter anderem la¨sst sich erken-
nen, dass Ma¨nner unabha¨ngig von der familia¨ren Situation gro¨ßtenteils Vollzeit ar-
beiten. Im Gegensatz dazu treffen Frauen mit verschiedenen Haushaltssituationen
unterschiedliche Arbeitsangebotsentscheidungen.
Eine der wichtigsten erkla¨renden Variablen fu¨r die Arbeitsstundenwahl ist das Net-
toeinkommen. Um dieses vom Bruttoeinkommen zu errechnen wurde von dem Team
um Dr.Zulehner am WIFO ein Steuer- Transferrechner fu¨r O¨sterreich entwickelt
welcher es ermo¨glicht, vom Brutto auf das Nettoeinkommen zu schlissen.
Die Scha¨tzung des Nutzens basiert auf zwei verschiedenen Funktionen, der translo-
gen und der quadratischen Nutzenfunktion.
Das unita¨re Modell scha¨tzt diese auf der Basis von Haushaltsvariablen.
Das kollektive Model ist etwas aufwendiger zu scha¨tzen. Man braucht eine Teilungsregel
welche aussagt, welchen Teil des Gesamteinkommens die Frau und welchen der Mann
bekommt. Diese Aufteilung wird gescha¨tzt anhand von Variablen so wie Einkom-
menspotenzial oder Lohn. Nachdem die individuellen Nutzen gescha¨tzt wurden, wer-
den diese zu einem Haushaltsnutzen kombiniert. Dies geschieht durch eine Gewich-
tung (laut Teilungsregel) der einzelnen Nutzenniveaus.
Ein klarer Nachteil der unita¨ren Modelle ist, dass individuelle Pra¨ferenzen keine
Relevanz haben und daher ko¨nnen Reaktionen der einzelnen Haushaltsmitglieder
nicht analysiert werden. Das kollektive Model erlaubt individuelle Pra¨ferenzen und
ermo¨glicht damit Analysieren von Politikmaßnahmen, welche ein Haushaltsmitglied
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mehr als ein anderes trifft.
Basierend auf dieser Grundlage wu¨rde man das kollektive Model bevorzugen. Jedoch
erweist sich dieses in der empirischen Scha¨tzung als problematischer. Zwei Methoden
wurden angewandt. Die erste, welche Zwischenresultate verwendet, um eine Kon-
sumscha¨tzung zu erzielen, fu¨hrt zu keinem Resultat. Der zweite Zugang, eine Kalib-
rierungsmethode, resultiert, wenn man dem Ansatz der Literatur folgt, im keinem
interpretierbaren Ergebnis. Es erlaubt uns jedoch eine alternative Errechnung des
kombinierten Haushaltsnutzens zu erzielen, indem man nicht bloß die Nutzenniveaus
gewichtet und addiert, sondern einen Interaktionsterm einbaut, welcher den Unter-
schied der Nutzen der Partner adressiert. Dieser zusa¨tzliche Term erlaubt es einen
besseren Fit zu erzielen.
Das unita¨re Model basiert auf der Annahme, dass die Herkunft des Einkommens
unentscheidend ist und nur das summierte Haushaltseinkommen die Konsum- und
Arbeitsangebotsentscheidung beeinflusst (Income Pooling Hypothese). Diese Hy-
pothese findet jedoch keine empirische Besta¨tigung. Dieses Ergebnis la¨sst uns an
den folgenden Resultaten zweifeln. Wir pra¨sentieren sie jedoch, da sie vielleicht
Grundtendenzen erkennen lassen. Das Ergebnis deutet darauf hin, dass der Nutzen
wie erwartet (in beiden Modellen) mit Konsum und Freizeit positiv assoziiert werden
kann. Frauen scheinen Freizeit mehr zu scha¨tzen, wenn mehrere ju¨ngere Kinder im
Haushalt leben. Beide Partner haben eine ho¨here Pra¨ferenz fu¨r Freizeit mit steigen-
dem Alter.
Vergleicht man die zwei Modelle fu¨r die EU-SILC Daten kann man festhalten, dass
das unita¨re Model einfacher zu scha¨tzen ist. Daher ist es ratsam mit dieser Scha¨tzung
zu beginnen und auch deren Income Pooling Hypothese zu testen. Muss Letztere
verworfen werden, deutet dies auf individuelle Pra¨ferenzen hin und man sollte ein
kollektives Model scha¨tzen. Diese zeichneten sich in dieser Arbeit durch ihre kom-
plexe empirische Analyse aus. Falls man als O¨konomIn jedoch an personenspezifis-
chen Arbeitsangebotsvera¨nderungen interessiert sein sollte, sind diese Hu¨rden wert
u¨berwunden zu werden.
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